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1ABSTRACT: We analyze optimal trading mechanisms in an exchange economy where each
trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a buyer, depending on
the realization of the privately observed valuations. The concept of virtual valuation is extended to
ex ante unidenti¯ed traders; contrary to the case where each trader is assigned a role as either a
buyer or a seller, the traders' virtual valuations now depend on the choice of the trading mechanism
and are generally non-monotonic even if the distribution of valuations is regular. We show that the
trading mechanisms that maximize a broker's expected pro¯t or expected total gains from trade
are generalized double auctions which maximize the gains from trade measured in some modi¯ed
monotonic virtual valuations for the traders. The bunching phenomena, which are here speci¯c
to ex ante unidenti¯ed traders, will be a general feature in these mechanisms. Furthermore, the
randomization rule by which ties are broken is now part of the design of the optimal mechanisms.
Finally, we show that the optimal mechanism converges toward a simple bid-ask mechanism as the
number of participants in the market increases.
KEYWORDS: Mechanism design, e±cient trading, intermediation, double auctions, ask-bid
mechanism.
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: D44, D82.
21 I ntr oduction
Myerson and Satterthwaite [15] consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a
single object. They show that the buyer and seller are unable to exhaust gains from trade if they have
incomplete information about each other and there is positive probability that there are no gains
from trade. They also show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from
trade, and mechanisms that maximize a broker's expected pro¯t. Since Myerson and Satterthwaite's
work, the literature has explored the implementability of ex post e±cient allocations and mechanisms
which are e±cient in some sense other than ex post.1 With some exceptions, it is assumed in the
literature, as in Myerson and Satterthwaite, that traders are ex ante identi¯ed buyers or sellers; that
is, either a seller sells a buyer a single unit, or no trade occurs. In Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer
[2], McAfee [11], and Spulber [19], this assumption is relaxed. Spulber [19] considers interim e±cient
mechanisms, McAfee [11] examines ex post e±ciency with continuous quantities, and Cramton et al.
[2] investigate e±cient mechanisms for dissolving a partnership.
This paper considers the problem of designing a rule to determine the terms of trade among
several traders who own some units of a good to be traded and have private information about
their preferences. In this context, a trader holding some units of the good (but less than his satiated
demand level) may be either a seller or a buyer, depending on the realization of the privately observed
information andthe choice of the mechanism; his role as a buyer or a seller is endogenously determined
by the traders' bids, but cannot be identi¯ed prior to trade. The multilateral trading problem studied
here extends models of Myerson [13], Myerson and Satterthwaite [15], and Gresik and Satterthwaite
[3] in which one unit of the good is demanded or supplied inelastically by each trader, and the model
of Cramton et al. [2] in which traders have the highest level of demand possible (the economy wide
endowment). The fact that a trader may be on either side of a trade creates di±culties beyond those
of the standard mechansim design problems and has important implications for the nature of the
optimal mechanisms.
Myerson and Satterthwaite [15] show that with incomplete information ex post e±ciency cannot
be achieved when the asset is owned by a single party. In contrast, Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer
1T he se issue s ha v e be e n the fo c us o f a numbe r o f pa pe rs inc luding Gre sik a nd Sa tte rthw a ite [3 ], Le ining e r et al. [7 ],
M a k o w sk i a nd M e z z e tti [9 ], Rustic hini et al. [1 7 ], Sa tte rthw a ite a nd Willia ms [1 8 ], Willia ms [2 0 ], a nd Wilso n [2 1 ].
3[2] show that if the ownership is distributed among a partnership, ex post e±cient allocation is
possible provided no single partner owns too large a share. McAfee [11] reinforces the conclusion of
Cramton et al. [2] by considering the hidden endowments model which symmetrizes the agents. Lu
[8] gives an explanation to these contrasting results by considering di®erent preferences. He shows
that the implementability of e±cient allocations is primarily determined by the degree of revelation
of private information required in achieving it. If the achievement of ex post e±ciency requires full
revelation of private information, it may be impossible to achieve ex post e±ciency when traders
are not ex ante identical. If the traders have inelastic demands for a ¯xed number of units, partial
revelation of private information is su±cient to allocate the goods e±ciently, and this allows for ex
post e±ciency to be possible for su±ciently symmetric distributions. Thus, the results of Myerson
and Satterthwaite and Cramton et al. are two extreme cases.
This paper characterizes the revenue-maximizing mechanism and the ex ante e±cient mechanism
(in the sense of HolmstrÄ om and Myerson [4]) when the traders have inelastic demands for a ¯xed
number of units. In the standard mechansim design literature (Myerson and Satterthwaite [15], and
many other similar papers), the minimum utility is always achieved by the highest or lowest type
independently of the choice of the mechanism, and the continuum of individual rationality constraints
are reduced to those for the highest or lowest types that are binding at the optimum. As a result,
the only constraints are the monotonicity of the allocations, which can also be ignored by assuming
that the distribution of types is regular, and optimal allocations are given by pointwise solutions.
In the present model, since it is no longer clear who is selling and who is buying prior to revelation
of types, traders with high types typically expect to be buyers, those with low types expect to be
sellers, and those in the middle do not expect to trade. Thus, contrary to the standard cases, the
minimum utility types for ex ante unidenti¯ed traders are those in the middle and generally depend
on the choice of the trading mechanism. Moreover, the monotonicity of a trader's virtual valuations
fails even if the distribution of types is regular, since high types expect to be buyers who have an
incentive to understate their valuations and low types expect to be sellers who tend to overstate
their valuations. Thus we must consistently determine the traders' worst-o® types who expect to
be neither a buyer nor a seller as well as the allocation rules and, at the same time, maximize the
objective function.
4The revenue-maximizing mechanism and the ex ante e±cient mechanism are characterized by
solving the trading mechanism that maximizes a weighted sum of expected total gains from trade
and expected pro¯t to the market maker. The optimal trading mechanism is characterized by some
modi¯ed monotonic virtual valuations: the goods will be assigned to the traders whose modi¯ed
virtual valuations are highest and ties will be broken by randomizing. In the optimal mechanism,
the participation constraints will be binding for some types other than the highest and lowest types,
and the bunching phenomenon which here is speci¯c to ex ante unidenti¯ed traders will be a general
feature. An algorithm is provided to compute the ranges of bunching that are uniquely determined
by the traders' initial endowments. The characterization of the optimal trading mechanism must also
include a randomization rule by which ties are broken. Unlike the standard models where bunching
is due to the irregularity of the distribution of valuations and all randomization rule is valid to break
ties, now the tie breaking rule is strictly restricted: it must make types in the middle to have expected
net trade zero. Hence the randomization rule becomes an important instrument in the design of the
optimal mechanism. Such rules can be constructed by an algorithm.
Finally, we consider what happens to the optimal mechanisms when the market becomes large.
We show that they converge towards simple bid-ask price mechanisms. Bid-ask price mechanisms are
common in many trading institutions, in particular ¯nancial market conducted by market makers.
The paper provides some theoretical justi¯cation for these institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Insection 2, we ¯rst de¯ne the formal structure of the
multilateral trading problem. We then present a general characterization of all incentive compatible
and individually rational mechanisms. In section 3, we show how to construct the trading mechanism
that maximizes a weighted sum of expected total gains from trade and expected pro¯t to the market
maker. In section 4, we show that the ex ante e±cient mechanism can be characterized by the optimal
mechanism obtained in section 3 for some weight. In section 5, we consider where the number of
agents in the economy becomes large, we show that the optimal mechanism converges to a ask-bid
mechanism.
52 An E xchange E conomy with E x Ante Unidenti¯ed T r ader s
We consider an exchange economy composed of n traders indexed by i 2 N = f1;2;¢¢¢;ng. Each
trader i owns ki units of an indivisible good to be traded and is privately informed about a preference
parameter (his \type") vi. Other traders do not observe a trader's type vi, but it is common
knowledge that the types are drawn independently from a distribution F with support [v;v] and
positive continuous density f. Throughout, we shall assume that the traders want to hold at most
k0 units of the good and ki · k0 for all i 2 N; that is, no trader is initially endowed with more than
what he wants to hold. The fact that traders all have some endowments means that any trader may
be a buyer or a seller in the trading game, and trader i has an inelastic demand for k0 ¡ki units or
supply of ki units when he is a buyer or seller.
A trader with type vi and initial endowment ki has preferences represented by the utility function
ui(q;t;vi) = vimin(q;k0 ¡ ki) ¡ t;
where q ¸ ¡ki is the net number of units bought by the trader and t is total spending on these units.
Each trader's utility function is normalized so that if he is to neither trade units nor make or receive
a cash payment, then his utility is zero for all type vi.2 Note that vi is the trader's reservation price
or valuation for each of the k0 ¯rst units of the good.3
The traders are going to participate in some trading mechanism to determine, ¯rst, who will
purchase additional units and who will sell their initial endowments and, second, how much a buyer
should pay for the units he bought and how much a seller should be paid for the units he sold. Our
general question is: what kinds of trading mechanisms can be designed that have good economic
e±ciency properties?
We consider the direct revelation mechanisms in which traders simultaneously reporttheir valuations4
v = (v1;v2;¢¢¢;vn) to a coordinater or market-maker who then determines an allocation q(v) =
2By no rma liz ing the utility func tio n, the re se rv a tio n utility ui(0 ;0 ;vi) = 0 is bro ug ht to be inde pe nde nt o f ty pe ,
but w e w ill se e , no t a s g e ne ra lly a ssume d in the lite ra ture , tha t the e x pe c te d utility is no t mo no to nic a lly inc re a sing
w ith the ty pe . If the utility is e x pre sse d in te rms o f g ro ss surplus, the re se rv a tio n utility is the n ty pe de pe nde nt.






i ), w he re v
j
i re pre se nts
the tra de r's v a lua tio n o f his j
th unit o f the g o o d. If the se v a lua tio ns a re no t pe rfe c tly c o rre la te d, it inv o lv e s a pro ble m
o f multidime nsio na l unc e rta inty w hic h a ppe a rs to be muc h mo re c o mplic a te d. (se e La ®o nt, M a sk in, a nd Ro c he t [6 ],
a nd Ro c he t [1 6 ]) F o r simplic ity , w e re stric t o urse lv e s to the o ne -dime nsio na l c a se .
4We a ssume tha t the initia l e ndo w me nts (k1;k2;:::;kn) a re c o mmo n k no w le dg e , but it is no t e sse ntia l. If the to ta l
numbe r o f units o f the g o o d K =
Pn
i=1 ki is k no w n, w e c a n a sk the tra de rs to re po rt the ir numbe rs o f units a nd the n
fo rbid tra de if the to ta l numbe r re po rte d do e s no t e q ua l K, a nd imple me nt the me c ha nism if the re po rts a g re e w ith K.
6(q1(v);¢¢¢;qn(v)) and a payment t(v) = (t1(v);¢¢¢;tn(v)), where qi is the net trade for trader i and
ti is the net money transfer from trader i. We require that these allocations balance:
Pn
i=1qi(v) = 0
for all v 2 [v;¹ v]n. For the moment, no restriction is made on
Pn
i=1ti(v), but the budget balance
condition will be required in section 4 when we look for ex ante e±cient mechanisms. Since all
traders want to hold at most k0 units, we can assume that ¡ki · qi(v) · k0 ¡ ki for all v 2 [v;v]n
and i 2 N. Also, we assume that each trader is endowed with enough money that any required
transfer is feasible. The pair of outcome functions fq;tg is referred to as a direct trading mechanism.
Let ¡i = Nnfig and let E¡i[ ¢ ] be the expectation operator with respect to v¡i. Then Qi(vi) =
E¡i[qi(vi;v¡i)] is i's expected net trade, and Ti(vi) = E¡i[ti(vi;v¡i)] is i's expected payment when
he announces vi. Consequently, the trader's expected payo® is
Ui(vi) = E¡i[ui(qi(v);ti(v);vi)] = viQi(vi)¡ Ti(vi):
The trading mechanism fq;tg is incentive compatible if each type of each trader wants to report his
private information truthfully when others report truthfully:
Ui(vi) ¸ viQi(^ vi) ¡ Ti(^ vi); 8i 2 N 8vi;^ vi 2 [v;v]: (1)
By the Revelation Principle (Myerson [13], among others), there is no loss of generality in restricting
our attentionto incentive compatible direct mechanisms. The mechanism fq;tg is interim individually
rational if all types of all traders are better o® participating in the mechanism (in terms of their
expected payo®) than holding their initial endowments:
Ui(vi) ¸ 0 8i 2 N and vi 2 [v;v]: (2)
The mechanism fq;tg is incentive feasible if it is incentive compatible and individually rational. We
will also say that an allocation q is implementable if there exists a transfer function t such that
fq;tg is an incentive feasible mechanism. The following lemma develops a necessary and su±cient
condition for a mechanism to be incentive feasible. The proof is in the Appendix.







Qi(u)du 8vi 2 [v;v] (3)
7Ui(v¤
i) ¸ 0; (4)
where5
v¤
i 2 V ¤(Qi) = fvijQi(u) · 0;8u < vi;Qi(w) ¸ 0;8w > vig: (5)
For any allocation q = (q1;¢¢¢;qn) such that Qi(vi) is non-decreasing for all i 2 N, V ¤(Qi) is
well-de¯ned in (5) and will be called the worst-o® types of trader i under allocation q. Equation (3)
implies that expected net utility Ui(vi) is continuous and convex in vi. Moreover, from (3) and (5),
Ui(vi) is minimized at any v¤
i 2 V ¤(Qi), so the continuum of constraints in (2) can be reduced to the
individual rationality constraint for a single v¤
i in (4). It is easy to show that V ¤(Qi) is a singleton
or a closed interval and all worst-o® types in the interior of V ¤(Qi) satisfy Qi(v¤
i) = 0. Intuitively,
as in Cramton et al. [2], a worst-o® type expects on average to be neither a buyer nor a seller of the
good, and therefore he has no incentive to overstate or understate his valuation. Hence, he does not
need to be compensated in order to induce him to report his valuation truthfully. In general, given
an incentive feasible mechanism fq;tg, it is no longer clear who is selling and who is buying prior to
revelation of types, but on average trader i is a buyer if his type vi ¸ maxV ¤(Qi) and a seller if his
type vi · minV ¤(Qi).
Let us de¯ne, for any ¸ ¸ 0 and v 2 [v;v]
®(vj¸) = v ¡¸
1¡ F(v)
f(v)




®(vj¸) and ¯(vj¸) are referred to as the ¸-virtual valuation of \buyer-type" and \seller-type", re-
spectively. Given an incentive feasible mechanism fq;tg, for any v¤






¯(vij¸); if vi < v¤
i ;
v¤
i; if vi = v¤
i ;




i;¸) is referred to as a ¸-virtual valuation under allocation q.6 Virtual valuations will play a
crucial role in construction of optimal trading mechanisms.
5T his le mma c a n be se e n a s a c o mbina tio n o f Le mma s 1 -3 o f C ra mto n et al. [2 ] e x c e pt tha t w e re de ¯ne V
¤(Qi)
by no nstric t ine q ua litie s. V ¤(Qi) is no w w e ll-de ¯ne d fo r a ll no n-de c re a sing func tio n Qi. If V ¤(Qi) w a s a s de ¯ne d in
Le mma 2 o f C ra mto n et al. by stric t ine q ua litie s, V
¤(Qi) w o uld be e mpty w he n Qi is c o nsta ntly z e ro o n a n inte rv a l.
Sinc e C ra mto n et al. o nly inv e stig a te the po ssibility o f e x po st e ±c ie nc y a nd the e x pe c te d ne t tra de Qi(vi) is stric tly
inc re a sing in a n e x po st e ±c ie nt a llo c a tio n, V
¤(Qi) is a sing le to n in the ir pa pe r. But w e lo o k fo r o ptima l tra ding
me c ha nisms tha t ma y ha v e Qi c o nsta nt o n a n inte rv a l (a s w ill be se e n, a c tua lly a po sitiv e ma ss o f ty pe s in the middle
e x pe c t to be ne ithe r a buy e r no r a se lle r in the se me c ha nisms), so the de ¯nitio n must be c o rre c te d so tha t V
¤(Qi) is
me a ning ful fo r a ll imple me nta ble a llo c a tio ns.
6M y e rso n [1 4 ] intro duc e d the c o nc e pt o f v irtua l v a lua tio n fo r e x a nte ide nti¯e d tra de rs. We e x te nd this c o nc e pt to
e x a nte unide nti¯e d tra de rs.
8Before proceeding further we should discuss virtual valuations. As observed earlier, a trader's
worst-o® types V ¤(Qi) typically are between v and v, then his virtual valuations are of both \buyer-
type" and \seller-type". If ¸ = 0, then ´(vijv¤
i;0) = vi. The virtual valuations equal the true
valuations under any implementable allocation. If, however, ¸ > 0, then ®(vij¸) < vi < ¯(vij¸) for
all vi 2 (v;v). Thus, for ¸ > 0, a trader's virtual valuations are distorted downward (upward) to be
below (above) his true valuations when he expects to be a buyer (seller). Intuitively, these distortions
express the strategic behavior that buyers have an incentive to understate their valuations and sellers
tend to overstate their valuations. Moreover, since ®(vij¸) < vi < ¯(vij¸) when ¸ > 0, ´(vijv¤
i ;¸)
is discontinuous at vi = v¤
i and is not monotonically increasing in vi over [v;v] for all distribution
of valuations. If ®(vij1) and ¯(vij1) are both strictly increasing, it is straightforward to verify that
for every ¸ 2 [0;1], ®(vij¸) and ¯(vij¸) are also strictly increasing, so ´(vijv¤
i;¸) is increasing over
[v;v¤
i) and (v¤
i;v] but there is a \buyer-seller" spread at v¤
i .
The following lemma characterizes implementable allocations and expresses the expected rev-
enue from incentive feasible mechanisms solely in terms of the allocation rule. The proof is in the
Appendix.
Lemma 2. For any allocation q = (q1;¢¢¢;qn) such that Qi(vi) is non-decreasing for all i 2 N, there
exists a payment function t such that fq;tg is incentive feasible. The maximum expected revenue















i ) = ´(vijv¤
i;1) and v¤
i 2 V ¤(Qi) for which the individual rationality is binding,7 i.e.,
Ui(v¤
i) = 0.
3 Optimal T r ading M echanisms
We now consider the case where the traders are intermediated by a broker (or market-maker) who
can be a net source or sink of money, but he cannot himself own the good. First, as in Myerson and
Satterthwaite [15], an interesting question is to ask for the mechanism which maximizes the expected
7N o te tha t w he n V
¤(Qi) is a n inte rv a l, sinc e the e x pe c te d ne t tra de Qi(vi) is z e ro o n this inte rv a l, the e x pe c te d





9revenue to the broker, subject to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
More generally, we can introduce an objective function that is a weighted sum of expected total gains
from trade and expected revenues to the market maker, and seek a mechanism that maximizes this
objective function subject to the incentive feasibility constraints for traders.
First, we de¯ne the objective function. For any ¸ 2 [0;1], let






where R(q) is given by (7) of Lemma 2. Our question is to seek a trading mechanism that maximizes








i 2 V ¤(Qi):









s.t. ¡ki · qi · k0 ¡ki for all i and
Pn
i=1qi = 0
Qi(vi) is non-decreasing and v¤
i 2 V ¤(Qi):
Thus solving for the incentive feasible mechanism that maximizes W¸(q) boils down to ¯nding the
allocation that maximizes the expected total gains from trade measured in ¸-virtual valuations.
Obviously, when ¸ = 1, P1 is the maximization of the expected revenue to the broker subject
to the incentive feasibility constraints. When ¸ = 0, P0 is the maximization of expected total gains






k0 ¡ ki; if vi is among the n0 highest values
r ¡ki; if vi is the (n0 +1)st highest value
¡ki; otherwise
(8)
where n0 and r are nonnegative integers such that n0k0+r equals the total number of units
Pn
i=1ki
and 0 · r < k0. In Section 4, we consider more carefully the problem of maximizing expected gains
from trade when the budget balance condition is required.
Notice that the virtual valuations ´(vijv¤
i ;¸) now depend on the allocation rules q through the
traders' worst-o® types V ¤(Qi), which may vary as q vary. Thus, to solve P¸, the main di±culty is
that we must consistently determine the traders' worst-o® types who expect to be neither a buyer
8N o tic e tha t sinc e tie s o c c c ur w ith z e ro pro ba bility , the y w ill no t a ®e c t e x pe c te d q ua ntitie s a nd so w ill be ig no re d
in w ha t fo llo w s.
10nor a seller as well as the allocation rules and, at the same time, maximize the objective function.
Since ex ante any trader can be either a buyer or seller, optimally the worst-o® types of traders are
unlikely to have an extreme valuation and there can be a positive measure of such traders.
To simplify matters, we will assume that the distribution F(v) is regular in the sense that ®(¢j1)
and ¯(¢j1) are both strictly increasing9 and concentrate our attention on the more interesting type
of bunching that is speci¯c to ex ante unidenti¯ed traders. For a given ¸, let x be such that
¯(xj¸) = ®(vj¸) = v, and for any xi 2 [v;x], let yi be such that ®(yij¸) = ¯(xij¸). De¯ne
±(vijxi;¸) =
(
´(vijxi;¸); if vi = 2 [xi;yi]
¯(xij¸); if vi 2 [xi;yi];
then from the regularity assumption, ±(vijxi;¸) is non-decreasing in vi. We can now state and prove
the main results of this paper.
Theorem 1. (a) Suppose that there exists an x¤ = (x¤
1;¢¢¢;x¤
n) 2 [v;x]n for which there exists at







s.t. ¡ki · qi · k0 ¡ ki for all i and
Pn
i=1qi = 0
(B) 8i;Qi(vi) = E¡i[qi(vi;v¡i)] = 0 for vi 2 (x¤
i;y¤
i);
then an allocation q¤ = (q¤
1;¢¢¢;q¤
n) is a solution to P¸ if and only if it satis¯es (A) and (B) for this
vector x¤. (b) If such a vector x¤ exists, it is unique.
Proof: (a) Su±ciency: Assume that q¤ satisfy (A) and (B) for some vector x¤ 2 [v;x]n, then q¤
must be a solution to P¸.












where l(vjx¤;¸) for any v is such that the number, N1, of traders with types vi for which ±(vijx¤
i;¸) ¸
l(vjx¤;¸) is at least n0 + 1, and the number, N2, for which ±(vijx¤
i;¸) > l(vjx¤;¸) is at most n0.10
9T his is the c a se fo r mo st c o mmo n distributio ns. Se e , e .g ., M y e rso n [1 4 ], fo r mo re de ta ils in the c a se w he re the
distributio n o f v a lua tio ns is no t re g ula r.
10T he a llo c a tio n q
¤ a s de ¯ne d in (9 ) w ith a ny ra ndo miz a tio n rule so lv e s the pro g ra m in (A ), but in o rde r to sa tisfy (B),
the ra ndo miz a tio n rule is stric tly re stric te d a nd must be c o nstruc te d in so me spe c i¯c w a y (se e Le mma 4 ). Obv io usly ,
a ny a llo c a tio n q(v) di®e ring fro m q
¤(v) o nly o n a se t o f z e ro me a sure a lso so lv e s the pro g ra m in (A ), but suc h di®e re nc e s
w ill be ig no re d.
11Since ±(vijx¤
i;¸) is non-decreasing in vi, then q¤
i (vi;v¡i) is non-decreasing in vi, and so for Q¤
i(vi).
Also, condition (B) implies that x¤
i 2 V ¤(Q¤
i) for all i. Thus, q¤ satis¯es all the constraints in P¸.


























´(vij^ vi;¸) b Qi(vi)
#
: (12)
Equality (10) follows immediately from the fact that by de¯nition, ±(vijx¤
i;¸) = ´(vijv¤
i;¸) for vi = 2
[x¤
i;y¤
i] and from (B), Q¤
i(vi) = 0 for vi 2 (x¤
i;y¤
i). Inequality (11) follows immediately from the fact
that q¤ satisfy (A). Inequality (12) follows from the fact that when vi < ^ vi, ±(vijx¤
i;¸) · ´(vij^ vi;¸)
and b Qi(vi) · 0 , and when vi > ^ vi, ±(vijx¤
i;¸) ¸ ´(vij^ vi;¸) and b Qi(vi) ¸ 0. Hence, ±(vijx¤
i;¸) b Qi(vi) ¸
´(vij^ vi;¸) b Qi(vi) for all vi. Hence q¤ solves P¸.
Necessity: Now let x¤ and q¤ satisfy (A) and (B) and assume that some alternative solution ^ q
to P¸ exists. Clearly, (11) cannot hold with strict inequality: contradicting the assumption that ^ q
solves P¸. So ^ q must solve the program in (A). Now suppose that ^ q does not satisfy (B), i.e., for at
least one i there is a type u 2 (x¤
i;y¤
i ) such that b Qi(u) 6= 0. Since b Qi(vi) is non-decreasing in vi, then
b Qi(vi) > 0 for all vi 2 [u;y¤
i ] or b Qi(vi) < 0 for all vi 2 [x¤
i;u]. If b Qi(u) > 0, then u ¸ maxV ¤( b Qi) and
±(vijx¤
i;¸) > ´(vij^ vi;¸) for all vi 2 (u;y¤
i) and ^ vi 2 V ¤( b Qi). If b Qi(u) < 0, then u · minV ¤( b Qi) and
±(vijx¤
i;¸) < ´(vij^ vi;¸) for all vi 2 (x¤
i;u) and ^ vi 2 V ¤( b Qi). Hence in both cases, the inequality in
(12) is strict, which contradicts the assumption that ^ q is a solution to P¸. Therefore, ^ q must satisfy
(A) and (B).
(b) Uniqueness: Suppose that x¤ and z¤ are two vectors satisfying the conditions in (a) and
x¤
i 6= z¤
i for at least one i. From (a), there exists an allocation q¤ satisfying (A) and (B) for x¤, so q¤




Theorem 1 characterizes the functional form of the solution to P¸. The optimal allocation can be
expressed in terms of non-decreasing virtual valuations ±(vijx¤




n). Roughly speaking, the goods will be assigned to the traders whose
12modi¯ed virtual valuations are highest. The optimal allocation is designed in such a way that a high
(low) type expects on average to be a net buyer (seller), and a positive mass of types in the middle
expect to be neither buyer nor seller. Thus the bunching phenomena in intermediate ranges, which
is here speci¯c to ex ante unidenti¯ed traders, will be a general feature in the optimal mechanism
even if the distribution of valuations is regular. Also from (9), when two traders or more have the
same ranges of bunching in the optimal allocation, ties occur with positive probability and must be
broken by randomizing. Unlike standard models where bunching is due to the irregularity of the
distribution of valuations and ties can be broken by any randomization rule, now the tie breaking
rule is strictly restricted: it must make types in the middle to have expected net trade zero. Hence
the randomization rule becomes part and parcel of the design of the optimal allocation.
To complete the characterization of the solution to P¸, we next show how to compute the vector
of worst-o® types and the randomization rule by which ties can be broken.
Theorem 2. There exists a unique x¤ = (x¤
1;¢¢¢;x¤
n) 2 [v;x]n for which there will exist at least
one randomization rule such that the allocation q¤ = (q¤
1;¢¢¢;q¤
n) as de¯ned in (9) satis¯es for all i,
Q¤
i(vi) = E¡i[q¤
i(vi;v¡i)] = 0 for vi 2 [x¤
i;y¤
i].
In order to provide the basic intuition for Theorem 2, we consider the problem for 2 traders. For
simplicity, we let k0 = k1+k2, where ki is the initial endowment of trader i. Here one trader receives
all the units of the other. Without loss of generality, we let k1 · k2. We wish to identify a set of x¤
i's
and, if necessary, arandomization rule that satisfy the conditions of Theorem 2. One of two cases are
possible, either traders share the same x¤ or they do not. We ¯rst suppose that they do and have
the same modi¯ed virtual valuation function. Since traders share a common bunching range over
which their virtual valuations are the same, there will be a positive probability of ties. Let p be the
probability that in such a case, the units are allocated to trader 1. Since Q¤
i(vi) = E¡i[q¤
i(vi;v¡i)] = 0
for vi 2 [x¤;y¤] and for i 2 f1;2g (recall that y¤ is de¯ned by ®(y¤j¸) = ¯(x¤j¸)), p and x¤ must be
such that the following holds:
k0F(x¤)+ k0p[F(y¤) ¡F(x¤)] ¡k1 = 0 (13)
k0F(x¤) +k0(1 ¡p)[F(y¤) ¡F(x¤)] ¡k2 = 0 (14)
13Adding these two equations yields the following condition:
2k0F(x¤) + k0 [F(y¤) ¡F(x¤)] = k1 +k2 = k0 or F(x¤) +F(y¤) = 1 (15)
Since y¤ is continuously increasing in x¤, there will exists a unique x¤ (and y¤) that satis¯es
the above condition. Note that x¤ is independent of p. So, the idea is to ¯rst ¯nd x¤ and y¤
using condition (15) and then calculate the probability p so as to solve equation (13). If k1 = k2,
we need simply to let p = 1=2. If k1 < k0=2 < k2, we need to move away from the symmetric
randomization rule. As long as [k1 ¡ k0F(x¤)] is non-negative, the conditions of Theorem 2 are met
with p =
k1¡k0F(x¤)
k0[F(y¤)¡F(x¤)]. Here the randomization rule matters, any alternative rule will move us
away from the zero-expected net trade condition.
However when [k1 ¡k0F(x¤)] is negative (which implies that [k2 ¡k0F(y¤)] is positive), there is
no positive p which satis¯es equation (13) for x¤ and y¤. This will occur when the inital endowments
are su±ciently asymmetric. In this case, we must have x¤
1 < x¤ < x¤
2 and the traders will not have
the same virtual valuation function. Indeed, for all v 2 [x¤
1;y¤
1]; we have ±(vjx¤
1;¸) < ±(vjx¤
2;¸), so
whenever v1 2 [x¤
1;y¤
1]; trader 1 of type v1 wins only if v2 < x¤
1: Hence, we need to ¯nd x¤
1 such
that k1 = k0F(x¤
1). Similarly, y¤
2 is such that k2 = k0F(y¤
2): Note that if [k1 ¡k0F(x¤)] is negative
and [k2 ¡k0F(y¤)] is positive, we must have x¤
1 < x¤ and y¤
2 > y¤, which in turn implies that
x¤
1 < x¤ < x¤
2. In this latter case, randomization rules do not matter since ties almost never occur,
however the mechanism discriminates in favor of trader 2 since his virtual valuation function lies
above that of trader 1.
The formal proof of Theorem 2 is a generalization of the above example with an arbitrary number
of traders. First, we ¯nd the vector of x¤
i's and in particular which groups of traders will share a same
x¤
i and modi¯ed virtual valuations. How to do this is explained in the Lemma 3, below. Second, for
those groups of traders that share a same x¤
i and have positive probability of ties, we must specify
a randomization rule that induces zero-expected net trade. This is done in Lemma 4.







j, from (9), we are clearly looking for a vector x¤ such that x¤
1 · x¤
2 · ¢¢¢ ·
x¤
n.
For now, consider the solution to (A) ~ q(v) (given some x¤ with x¤
1 · x¤
2 · ¢¢¢ · x¤
n) where ties
14are always broken in favor of those with the highest indexes. Let e Qi(x¤
i) = E¡i[~ qi(x¤
i;v¡i)] be the
expected net trade for participant i of type x¤
i under this alloaction rule (generally, e Qi(x¤
i) 6= 0).
e Qi(x¤
i) is well-de¯ned and independent of x¤
¡i provided the rank of x¤
i is preserved.11
Lemma 3. (a) A vector x¤ with x¤
1 · x¤
2 · ¢¢¢ · x¤
n satis¯es the conditions of Theorem 2, only
if it is such that whenever x¤
l = x¤
S 8l 2 S = fi;¢¢¢;jg with i · j and x¤
l 6= x¤
S 8l = 2 S, we have
Pm
l=i e Ql(x¤




S) = 0. (b) Such a vector x¤ exists.
Proof of Lemma 3: (a) Suppose that x¤ is a vector for which there exist at least one random-
ization rule such that the allocation q¤ = (q¤
1;¢¢¢;q¤
n) as de¯ned in (9) satis¯es for all i, Q¤
i(vi) = 0
for vi 2 [x¤
i;y¤
i]. Note that the ±(vijx¤
i;¸) increases up to x¤
i, then is constant between x¤
i and y¤
i ,






i 8j 6= i, since the probability of ties between i of type x¤
i and any other participants
is zero, we must have e Qi(x¤
i) = Q¤
i(x¤
i) = 0. Now consider a subset of participants, S = fi;¢¢¢;jg
with i < j, we have x¤
l = x¤
S 8l 2 S and x¤
l 6= x¤
S 8l = 2 S. Participants in S will have a strict positive




0 because i of type x¤
S always loses ties against participants of higher indexes in S in the solution
leading to e Qi(x¤
S). Similarly, since all l 2 fi;¢¢¢;mg (i · m · j) always loses ties against participants
of indexes higher than m in the solution leading to e Ql(x¤
S), and the total expected net trade for the
group of participants fi;¢¢¢;mg of type x¤








S) = 0. Finally, for m = j, since the probability of ties









(b) We show by construction the existence of a unique x¤ which satsi¯es the conditions of Lemma
11F o rma lly , w e de ¯ne fo r a ll xi 2 [v;v]
e Qi(xi) = k0Prf the re a re le ss tha n n0 o the r tra de rs w ho ha v e e ithe r v a lua tio n g re a te r tha n yi a nd
inde x lo w e r tha n i o r v a lua tio n g re a te r tha n xi a nd inde x hig he r tha n ig
+ rPrf the re a re e x a c tly n0 o the r tra de rs w ho ha v e e ithe r v a lua tio n g re a te r tha n yi a nd
inde x lo w e r tha n i o r v a lua tio n g re a te r tha n xi a nd inde x hig he r tha n ig
¡ ki
w he re yi is suc h tha t ®(yij¸) = ¯(xij¸) if xi · x a nd yi = v if xi > x. T he n fo r a ny x¤ w ith x¤
1 · ¢¢¢ · x¤
n, e Qi(x¤
i) is
the e x pe c te d ne t tra de unde r a llo c a tio n ~q.
153. We ¯rst ¯nd recursively the vector ~ x = (~ x1;¢¢¢; ~ xn) such that for all l,12
l X
i=1
e Qi(min(~ xi;¢¢¢; ~ xl)) = 0 or ~ xl = ¹ x if
l X
i=1
e Qi(min(~ xi;¢¢¢; ~ xl)) < 08~ xl < ¹ x (16)
First note that traders with index i · l and with types between ~ xi = v and the corresponding yi,
will always have virtual valuations less than those of the other traders, they will collectively always
be a source of units and their expected net trade will be negative:
Pl
i=1 e Qi(v) · 0.
Since e Q1(v) · 0, strict monotonicity and continuity of e Q1(¢) imply the existence of a unique
solution ~ x1. Given this ~ x1, we next ¯nd the unique ~ x2 such that e Q1(min(~ x1; ~ x2)) + e Q2(~ x2) = 0; or
~ x2 = ¹ x if it is negative for all ~ x2 < ¹ x. Again, e Q1(v) + e Q2(v) · 0, so there exists a unique solution
~ x2. We then proceed recursively to ¯nd all ~ xl, l · n¡1. Finally, given ~ x1;¢¢¢; ~ xn¡1 we solve for ~ xn.
Note that when ~ xn = v, we have
Pn
i=1 e Qi(min(~ xi;¢¢¢; ~ xn)) =
Pn
i=1 e Qi(v) · 0. Now suppose that
~ xn = x and let l < n be the highest index such that ~ xl < x. We have
Pn
i=1 e Qi(min(~ xi;¢¢¢; ~ xn)) =
Pl
i=1 e Qi(min(~ xi;¢¢¢; ~ xl)) +
Pn
i=l+1 e Qi(¹ x) =
Pn
i=1 e Qi(¹ x) ¸ 0: The last inequality follows because
traders with the highest indexes and with types between ¹ x and ¹ v, will always have virtual valuations
higher than those of the other traders, they will collectively always be a sink of units with positive
expected net trade. Hence, there exists a unique ~ xn 2 [v;x] which solves the nth equation in (14).
Next we set x¤
i = min(~ xi;¢¢¢; ~ xn). One can verify that by construction x¤
1 · ¢¢¢ · x¤
n · ~ xn · x.
Now suppose that x¤
l = x¤
S 8i · l · j, x¤
l < x¤
S 8l · i ¡ 1, and x¤
l > x¤
S 8l ¸ j + 1. From this
assumption, x¤
l = min(~ xl;¢¢¢; ~ xi¡1) for 1 · l · i ¡ 1 and x¤
l = min(~ xl;¢¢¢; ~ xj) · min(~ xl;¢¢¢; ~ xm)
for 1 · l · m · j. In particular, we have ~ xi¡1 = x¤
i¡1 < ¹ x and ~ xj = x¤
j < ¹ x, which imply that
Pi¡1
l=1
e Ql(min(~ xl;¢¢¢; ~ xi¡1)) = 0 and
Pj
l=1
















e Ql(min(~ xl;¢¢¢; ~ xm))¡
i¡1 X
l=1
e Ql(min(~ xl;¢¢¢; ~ xi¡1))
· 0
where the last two inequalities hold with equalities when m = j. Q.E.D
12Ea c h e Qi(~xi) is a s de ¯ne d in fo o tno te 1 1 . It is e a sy to v e rify tha t e Qi(~xi) is c o ntino us a nd stric tly inc re a sing o n
[v;v] fo r a ll i · n¡ 1 , a nd e Qn(~xn) is c o ntino us a nd stric tly inc re a sing o n [v;x] a nd c o nsta nt o n [x;v].
16To complete the proof of Theorem 2, it remains to prove that given the vector x¤ satisfying the
condition of Lemma 3, a randomization rule can be ¯nd. The formal proof of the following lemma
is given in the appendix.
Lemma 4. If a vector x¤ satisfy the conditions of Lemma 3, then there exists a randomization rule
such that q¤ as de¯ned in (9) satis¯es for all i, Q¤
i(vi) = 0 for vi 2 [x¤
i;y¤
i].
Theorems 1 and 2 prove a complete characterization of the optimal allocation. In the terminology
of Wilson [22], the optimal allocation can be called as a generalized double auction in virtual valua-
tions that maximizes the expected gains from trade measured in the virtual valuations ±(vijx¤
i;¸) for
the traders. What is particular here is that the tie-breaking rule now a®ects the traders' expected net
trades, hence it becomes an important instrument in the design of the optimal trading mechanism
in order to make the types in the middle to have expected net trade zero.
In the following theorem, we provide two basic comparative results.
Theorem 3. The weighted sum W¸(q¤) of the expected gains from trade and the expected revenue
from the optimal allocation is (i) strictly increasing with k0 and (ii) non-decreasing as the initial
endowments become more symmetric.
Proof: (i) To show that W¸(q¤) is strictly increasing in k0, notice that the optimal allocation q¤
given some initial k0
0 is feasible with a higher k00
0 > k0
0. Furthermore, q¤ is not optimal since q¤ cannot
satisfy condition (A) of Theorem 1 with k00
0. (In the allocation q¤, only k0
0 ¡ ki units are transfered
to trader i when his valuation is high, but optimally the net number of units bought by the trader
should be k00
0 ¡ki.) There must exist a ^ q which generates higher value for W¸.
(ii) Let q¤ be the optimal allocation with initial endowments (k1;¢¢¢;kn). Now suppose that we
reallocate the initial endowment so that ka
i = aki+(1¡a)kj, ka
j = (1¡a)ki+akj for some a 2 (0;1),
and ka
l = kl for l 6= i;j. First, we de¯ne an allocation qa as follows. For any v, let w be the vector
with wi = vj, wj = vi, and wl = vl for l 6= i;j and
qa
i (v) = aq¤







l (v) = aq¤
l (v) +(1 ¡a)q¤
l (w) 8l 6= i;j;
then qa is implementable. Indeed,
Pn
l=1qa
l (v) = a
Pn
l=1q¤
l (v) + (1 ¡ a)
Pn
l=1q¤
l (w) = 0; ¡kl · q¤
l ·
k0 ¡ kl for all l imply ¡ka
l · qa
l · k0 ¡ ka
l for all l; and ¯nally since all traders have a common








l (vl) = Q¤
l (vl) for l 6= i;j. Hence Qa
l (vl) is also non-decreasing for all l and there must be an
incentive feasible mechanism implementing qa.
Second, we have for v¤
l 2 V ¤(Q¤
l) and va














































The last inequality follows from the fact that for any given ^ v, (´(vlj^ v;¸)¡´(vljv¤
l ;¸))Q¤
l (vl) ¸ 0 for
l = i;j. Therefore, W¸(qa) ¸ W¸(q¤).13 This completes our proof. Q.E.D
Intuitively, since the optimal allocation requires that all goods go to the traders whose virtual
valuations are highest, thenwhenthe traders have a higher level of demand, the goods will be assigned
to a smaller number of traders with the highest virtual valuations and W¸(q¤), which is the expected
gains from trade from the optimal allocation measured in virtual valuations, increases. On the other
hand, each trader may bid either higher or lower than his true valuation, depending on whether he
is more likely to sell or buy in the ultimate transaction; the cost of satisfying informational incentive
constraints depends on the trader's types partition (low types to be sellers, high types to be buyers,
and to be neither buyers nor sellers between them) and decreases as the partition becomes more
symmetric. This implies that when the initial endowments are more evenly distributed amongst
the traders, the expected information rents accruing to all traders can be reduced and there may
be more expected revenue from the trading mechanism yielding a higher W¸. This intuition also
13T he ine q ua lity is stric t if the ra ng e s o v e r w hic h Q
¤
i(vi) = 0 a nd the ra ng e s o v e r w hic h Q
¤
j(vj) = 0 do no t c o inc ide .
So , if initia lly i a nd j ha v e di®e re nt bunc hing inte rv a ls, W¸(q
¤) stric tly inc re a se s a s the initia l e ndo w me nts be c o me
mo re sy mme tric be tw e e n i a nd j; but if jkj ¡kij is sma ll so tha t the ir bunc hing ra ng e s a re the sa me , a mo re sy mme tric
distributio n o f the e ndo w me nts be tw e e n i a nd j do e s no t a lte r the ir c o mmo n bunc hing inte rv a l a nd no r W¸ be c a use
q
a is the o ptima l a llo c a tio n w ith k
a
i a nd k
a
j.
18gives an explanation to the result of the next section that the expected gains from trade from the
ex ante e±cient allocation is non-decreasing as the initial endowments become more symmetric, as
well as the result of Cramton et al. [2] that there is a link between ex post e±cient mechanisms and
symmetry of endowments.
4 E x Ante E ±cient M echanisms
In this section, we show that the optimal allocation constructed in Theorems 1 and 2 can be useful
to characterize the most e±cient trading mechanism subject to the constraint that traders are not
subsidized. Cramton et al. [2] examine a special case of this trading problem in which traders have
the highest level of demand possible (the economy wide endowment). Despite incomplete information
about the valuation of the object, they show that ex post e±ciency can be achieved when the object
is initially jointly owned, with no player having too large a share. Lu [8] extends the work of
Cramton et al. by considering more standard preferences, and shows that the implementability of ex
post e±cient allocations is primarily determined by the degree of revelation of private information
required in achieving it. In the case of linear demand, for example, the achievement of ex post
e±ciency requires full revelation of private information, and it is impossible to have an incentive
feasible mechanism that is ex post e±cient except when all traders are ex ante symmetric. When the
traders have inelastic demands for a ¯xed number of units, partial revelation of private information
is su±cient to allocate the goods e±ciently and this allows for ex post e±ciency to be possible as in
Cramton et al. when the traders are su±ciently symmetric.
Since ex post e±ciency may not be achieved by any incentive feasible mechanism in asymmet-
ric economic environments, unless some outsider is willing to provide a subsidy to the traders for
participating in the trading mechanism, it is natural to seek a mechanism that maximizes expected
total gains from trade, subject to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints,









s.t. ¡ki · qi · k0 ¡ki and
Pn
i=1qi = 0
fq;tg is incentive feasible and
Pn
i=1ti = 0.
The following result that is an adaptation of Theorem 1 of Myerson and Satterthwaite [15] and
Lemma 4 of Cramton et al. [2], allows to remove the payment function from problem Ps. The proof
is given in the Appendix.
Lemma 5. For any allocation q such that Qi(vi) is non-decreasing for all i 2 N, there exists a pay-
ment functiont with
Pn





i 2 V ¤(Qi).15








s.t. ¡ki · qi · k0 ¡ ki and
Pn
i=1 qi = 0
Qi(vi) is non-decreasing and E[
Pn
i=1 ´(vijv¤
i )qi(v)] ¸ 0; where v¤
i 2 V ¤(Qi):
The following theorem proves that all solution to Ps is a solution to P¸ for some ¸.
Theorem 4. There exists a ¸ 2 [0;1) such that one allocation q is a solution to Ps if and only if q
solves P¸.




i(v)] ¸ 0 where v¤
i 2 V ¤(Qe
i),













= 0; where x¤
i = minV ¤(Qi): (17)
The existence of ¸ such that q¤(vj¸) satis¯es (15) follows from the fact that the expected revenue
14Se e , e .g ., H o lmstrÄo m a nd M y e rso n [4 ]. H e re w e fo c us just o n the e x a nte e ±c ie nt me c ha nism tha t pla c e s e q ua l
w e lfa re w e ig hts o n e v e ry tra de r a nd ma x imiz e s the sum o f a ll tra de rs' e x pe c te d g a ins fro m tra de . T his ma x imiz a tio n
is e q uiv a le nt to ma x imiz ing the sum o f the tra de rs' e x a nte e x pe c te d utilitie s be c a use e a c h tra de r's utility func tio n is
se pa ra ble in mo ne y a nd his v a lua tio n.
15A s a c o ro lla ry o f Le mma 5 , the re e x ists a n inc e ntiv e fe a sible me c ha nism tha t c a n imple me nt the e x po st e ±c ie nt










i). Lu [8 ] sho w s tha t g iv e n k0-unit de ma nd, the se t o f e ndo w me nts fo r w hic h e x po st e ±c ie nc y is po ssible





16A s o ne w o uld e x pe c t, the re is o nly o ne suc h ¸: T he pro o f o f this is o mmitte d.
20is continuous in ¸,17 negative when ¸ = 0, and positive when ¸ = 1. Now recall that q¤(vj¸)
maximizes W¸(¢) a weighted sum of expected gains from trade and the market-maker's revenue. So
any alternative implementable allocation q would either generate less (i.e. negative) revenue to the
market-maker and hence not satisfy the budget balance condition, or would generate less gains from
trade. q¤(vj¸) is indeed the solution to Ps. Q.E.D
From Theorem 4, maximizing expected gains from trade, subject to incentive feasibility and
budget constraints, is equivalent to maximizing a speci¯c weighted sum of expected gains from trade
and the market-maker's revenue. The ex ante e±cient allocation is also a generalized double auction
in ¸-virtual valuations for some ¸ such that the market-maker's expected revenue equals zero. Since




i(vj1)] > 0; so the
revenue-maximizing allocation can never be ex ante e±cient. We can make a comparison between a
market-maker in this exchange economy and a monopoly seller. Here the ex ante e±cient allocation
is socially optimal, but it is not optimal for the market-maker who will sacri¯ce some e±ciency for
the purpose of rent extraction. It is exactly what a pro¯t-maximizing monopoly does in the usual
context.
Given k0-unit demand and initial endowments (k1;¢¢¢;kn), let Ga be the expected total gains
from trade of ex ante e±cient allocations (the maximum gain from trade given the incentive feasibility
constraints and the balanced budget constraint).
Theorem 5. The expected total gains from trade from the ex ante e±cient allocation Ga is (i)
strictly increasing with k0 and (ii) non-decreasing as the initial endowments become more symmetric.
Proof: This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3 except that we must additionally check
the budget balance condition.
(i) To show that Ga is strictly increasing in k0, notice that the solution q¤ to Ps given some
initial k0
0 is implementable with a higher k00
0 > k0
0. Furthermore, q¤ is not optimal since q¤ cannot be
a solution to P¸ with k00
0 for any ¸. There must exist a ^ q which generates more gains from trade.
(ii) As in the proof of Theorem 3, let q¤ be the solution to Ps with initial endowments ki and kj,













i(¢j¸)) is c o ntinuo us, o bse rv e tha t fro m ®(yi;¸) =
¯(xi;¸), yi a s a func tio n o f xi a nd ¸ is c o ntinuo us, w hic h implie s tha t the func tio n e Qi(xi;¸) is c o ntinuo us in xi a nd ¸.
T hus, the so lutio n ~x to (1 4 ) is c o ntinuo us in ¸, a nd so fo r x
¤. F urthe r, the c o ntinuity o f x













must be c o ntinuo us in ¸.
21and reallocate the initial endowment and de¯ne the allocation qa. It is shown that qa is implementable
with the reallocated endowments and generates at least as much revenue as q¤; thus qa satis¯es the




l (v)] ¸ 0. Further, since Qa
i(vi) = aQ¤




j(vj) +(1 ¡ a)Q¤
i(vj), and Qa
l (vl) = Q¤
l (vl) for l 6= i;j, and all traders have a common












Thus qa generates as much gains from trade as q¤, which implies that Ga is non-decreasing as the
initial endowments become more symmetric. Q.E.D
5 Conver gence to B id-ask M echanisms
We have characterized the optimal allocation in the context of an exchange economy when there
are few participants and everyone takes advantage of opportunities to a®ect the terms of trade. We
consider in this section, how the optimal allocation changes as the number of traders increases. More
precisely, our aim is to establish that, provided the number of traders is large enough, the optimal
trading mechanism converges toward a bid-ask mechanism.
Given an n-player trading problem N, let denote nl the number of traders each of whom has an
endowment of l units. Let ¿N be the ¿-fold replication of N. That is, there are ¿n traders, with
¿nl traders owning l units of the traded good. The total number of units in ¿N is ¿K. In order to
evaluate the objective function W¸ when ¿ ! 1, we divide it by the number of replication. For all















i 2 V ¤(Qi):





For some given ¸, let ^ x 2 [v;x] be de¯ned by (nk0¡K)(1¡F(^ y)) = KF(^ x) with ®(^ yj¸) = ¯(^ xj¸),
18F o r a ll Q = (Q1;Q2;¢¢¢;Q¿n) w ith ¡ki · Qi · k0 ¡ ki fo r a ll i, lim¿! 1 f W¸(Q1;¢¢¢;Q¿n) is w e ll-de ¯ne d, be c a use
f f W¸(Q1;¢¢¢;Q¿n)g
1







22and let ^ q be the allocation de¯ned as




k0 ¡ki; if vi > ^ y;
0; if ^ x · vi · ^ y;
¡ki; if vi < ^ x:
(18)
One can verify that E [
Pn




= 0: That is, the allocation ^ q balances in
expected terms; however it does not for all values of v. The allocation ^ q corresponds to a simple
bid-ask mechanism where the market maker sets two prices ^ x and ^ y. A participant will sell all his
units if and only if he is willing to sell them at a price equal to ^ x. Conversely, he will buy (k0 ¡ ki)
units if and only if he is willing to pay ^ y.
Theorem 6. As the number of replication of the economy increases, the optimal trading mechanism
converges to the bid-ask mechanism ^ q. More precisely, let q¤¿ be the optimal allocation given some
¿ and ¸. Then for all i and almost all vi 2 [v;v], we have lim¿!1 Q¤¿
i (vi) = b Qi(vi)
Proof: We ¯rst compare the values for the objective function with allocations ^ q and q¤¿. We
have










Note thataddingthe constant ¹has noe®ectonthis di®erentialsince E[
Pn¿
i=1 Q¤¿





0: So if we let ¹ = ±(^ xj^ x;¸); the above expression can be rewritten as




















This di®erential is positive because the expression in each expectation is positive. Indeed, when
vi < ^ x, ±(vij^ x;¸) ¡ ±(^ xj^ x;¸) · 0 and b Qi(vi) ¡ Q¤¿
i (vi) = ¡ki ¡ Q¤¿
i (vi) · 0; when ^ x · vi · ^ y,
±(vij^ x;¸) ¡ ±(^ xj^ x;¸) = 0; when vi > ^ y, ±(vij^ x;¸) ¡ ±(^ xj^ x;¸) ¸ 0 and b Qi(vi) ¡ Q¤¿
i (vi) = k0 ¡
ki ¡ Q¤¿
i (vi) ¸ 0. Hence (±(vij^ x;¸) ¡ ±(^ xj^ x;¸))( b Q(vi) ¡ Q¤¿
i (vi)) ¸ 0: Similarly, (±(vij^ x;¸) ¡
±(vijx¤
i;¸))Q¤¿
i (vi) ¸ 0. When Q¤¿
i (vi) > 0, ±(vijx¤¿
i ;¸) = ®(vij¸) · ±(vij^ x;¸) and when Q¤¿
i (vi) < 0,
±(vijx¤¿
i ;¸) = ¯(vij¸) ¸ ±(vij^ x;¸): The above implies that the simple bid-ask mechanism b Q dominates
all the incentive-feasible mechanisms.
23Now consider an alternative allocation ~ q given by
~ qi(vi;v¡i) =
8
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; if vi > ^ y










; if vi < ^ x:
(20)
where Nb = fi 2 ¿Njvi > ^ yg and Ns = fi 2 ¿Njvi < ^ xg. The allocation ~ q resembles the allocation
^ q, however it is constructed to insure that resources balance ex post:
Pn¿
i=1 ~ q(v) = 0 for all v. Since
q¤¿ maximizes W¸(¢) over all implementable and resource balancing allocations which include ~ q, we
must have f W¸(q¤¿) ¸ f W¸(~ q). Since V ¤( e Qi) = V ¤( b Qi) = [^ x; ^ y], it follows that






(±(vij^ x;¸)¡ ±(^ xj^ x;¸)) ( b Qi(vi) ¡ e Qi(vi))
#
¸ f W¸( b Q)¡ f W¸(Q¤¿): (21)
The main idea of the proof is to show that as the economy replicates, e Qi(vi) converges to b Qi(vi)
for all i and vi. Indeed, from the law of large numbers, the proportion of traders with an endowment
of l units and valuations greater than ^ y equals
nl
n (1¡F(^ y)) when the market size is su±ciently large.
Thus, the total demand for the good is
X
i2Nb






(1 ¡F(^ y)) = ¿(k0n ¡K)(1 ¡ F(^ y)):
In the same way, the proportion of traders with l units and valuations less than ^ x equals
nl
n F(^ x),


















(k0n ¡K)(1 ¡ F(^ y))
KF(^ x)
= 1
with probability one, which implies that ~ q as de¯ned in (20) converges to ^ q and ~ Q converges to b Q
when the market size increases.
It follows that f W¸( b Q)¡ f W¸(Q¤¿) converge toward zero. Hence from (19), for all i and almost all
vi we must have that (±(vij^ x;¸) ¡ ±(^ xj^ x;¸))( b Q(vi) ¡ Q¤¿
i (vi)) and (±(vij^ x;¸) ¡ ±(vijx¤¿
i ;¸))Q¤¿
i (vi)
converge to 0 as ¿ increases. If ±(vij^ x;¸) 6= ±(^ xj^ x;¸), i.e. when vi < ^ x or vi > ^ y, from the ¯rst
convergence we must have Q¤¿
i (vi) ! b Q(vi). Now from the second convergence, either Q¤¿
i (vi) ! 0
or ±(vijx¤¿
i ;¸) ! ±(hatxj^ x;¸) for all vi 2 [^ x; ^ y] (for which b Q(vi) = 0), which implies that x¤¿
i ! ^ x
24and y¤¿
i ! ^ y which in turn implies that Q¤¿
i (vi) ! 0. In both cases, we have established that
Q¤¿
i (vi) ! b Qi(vi). Q.E.D
As the number of participants increases, the bid-ask price mechanism becomes more or less ex
post resource balancing. So a mechanism relatively close to it may be used by the market-maker
to maximize his objective function. Also as a corollary of Theorems 5 and 7, we can show that
ex ante e±ciency converges to ex post e±ciency as the market size increases (also see Gresik and
Satterthwaite [3]).
Theorem 8. The ex ante e±cient allocation coincides with the ex post e±cient allocation, and can
be implemented by setting a single price ^ x = ^ y = F¡1(1 ¡ p) at which traders can buy or sell units
as the market size increases.
Proof: Whenever ¸ > 0, we have that ^ x < ^ y. So the bid-ask price mechanism ^ q will generate
strict positive revenue to the market-maker. As the market size increase, the optimal allocation q¤¿
given ¸ will converge to ^ q and will also generate pro¯ts to the market-maker. So as the market size
increases, we can decrease ¸ towards zero and the solution to problem Ps converges to the ex post
e±cient allocation. Q.E.D
25Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If the trading mechanism fq;tg is incentive compatible, then for any two
valuations vi;v¤
i 2 [v;v],








i ) ¸ v¤
iQi(vi) ¡Ti(vi)
These two inequalities imply that
(vi ¡v¤
i )Qi(vi) ¸ Ui(vi) ¡ Ui(v¤
i) ¸ (vi ¡v¤
i)Qi(v¤
i )
Thus, if vi > v¤
i , we must have Qi(vi) ¸ Qi(v¤
i ), so Qi(vi) is non-decreasing. Furthermore, the above
inequalities also imply that Ui(vi) is absolutely continuous, thus di®erentiable almost everywhere
with derivative dUi








i 2 V ¤(Qi), then Qi(vi) ¸ 0 (· 0) for vi > v¤
i (< v¤




i Qi(u)du ¸ 0 for all vi; thus the expected net utility Ui(vi) is minimized at v¤
i and fq;tg is
individually rational if and only if Ui(v¤
i) ¸ 0.
Suppose now that the mechanism fq;tg is such that Qi(vi) is non-decreasing and Ui(vi) satis¯es
(18) for some v¤
i 2 V ¤(Qi) with Ui(v¤
i) ¸ 0, then for any vi, ^ vi 2 [v;v],
Ui(vi)¡ Ui(^ vi) =
Z vi
^ vi
Qi(u)du ¸ (vi ¡ ^ vi)Qi(^ vi)
where the inequality follows from the fact that Qi(u) is non-decreasing in u. This inequality can be
rewritten as
Ui(vi) ¸ Ui(^ vi) + (vi ¡ ^ vi)Qi(^ vi) = viQi(^ vi) ¡Ti(^ vi)
Thus, fq;tg is incentive compatible. In the above, we have already shown that if Ui(v¤
i ) ¸ 0, an
incentive compatible mechanism is also individually rational. Q.E.D
26Proof of Lemma 2. For any function q(v) such that Qi(vi) is non-decreasing, if fq;tg is an



































Thus, the maximum expected revenue from any incentive feasible mechanism implementing q(v)






To complete the proof, we must construct a payment function t(v) so that fq;tg is an incentive
feasible mechanism leading R(q). There are many such functions which could be used; we will
consider a function de¯ned as follows:






i 2 V ¤(Qi). Then Ui(v¤
i) = 0 and Ui(vi) =
R vi
v¤
i Qi(u)du. From Lemma 1, the mechanism
fq;tg is incentive feasible and has an expected revenue equal to R(q). Thus, our proof of Lemma 2
is complete. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 4. Randomization rules matter only when a group of participants share the
same x¤. So let x¤
l = x¤
S 8l 2 S = fi;¢¢¢;jg with i · j and x¤
l 6= x¤








S) = 0. Typically, participants in S with the
lowest indexes will, according to the allocation rule ~ q, have negative expected net trade. Hence, we
need to increase the probability that the low index participants are awarded units in case of a tie to
garantee that the expected net trades are equal for all participants in S.
We implement some randomization rule, by randomly assigning a hierarchy rank to each par-
ticipant in the subset S. The tie breaking rule of ~ q is then used and gives participants assigned
27to higher hierarchy rank (instead of those with higher index) the advantage in case of a tie. The
random assignment process is constructed in such a way that participants in subset S have the same
expected net trade, that is 0. Note that when participant with index m is given the rank l, his
expected net trade, denoted by e Ql
m(x¤
S), is given by e Ql(x¤





l) + kl) = km, where ®l
m is the probability that participant with index m is
assigned rank l in the hierarchy. To achieve this, one can construct a sequence of at most (j ¡i¡1)
one-by-one random permutations from the initial index to a ¯nal hierarchy.
Let m be the lowest index in S with strictly negative net trade and l be the lowest index in S
with strict positive net trade. We must have m < l, because otherwise we would have Qh(x¤
S) = 0 for
i · h · l¡1 and thus
Pl
h=i e Qh(x¤
S) > 0. We assign some probability ®l
m that participant m is given







S) + kl ¡ km
i
. Since e Ql
m(x¤
S) = e Ql(x¤
S)+kl ¡km ¸ e Ql(x¤
S) > 0
and e Qm(x¤
S) < 0, there exists a unique ®l
m such that the expected net trade of m becomes zero. So
we set ®l
m to the value for m's net expected trade to become zero. We next proceed with a new
pair of participans m and l, selected as before, given the new adjusted Q0
is: In each round, we bring
the expected net trade of at least one participant to zero, so after at most (j ¡ i ¡ 1) rounds, the
expected net trades of all participants in S will be zero. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 5. For any function q(v) such that Qi(vi) is non-decreasing, if there exists a
payment function t so that fq;tg is incentive feasible and
Pn
i=1ti(v) = 0 for all v, then from Lemma
2, we must have E[
Pn
i=1´(vijv¤
i)qi(v)] ¸ 0 where v¤
i 2 V ¤(Qi).
Suppose now that q satis¯es the above inequality, we must construct the payment function t(v)
so that fq;tg is incentive feasible and
Pn





















[uf(u) +F(u)¡ 1]Qj(u) du





S) + km = k0Prf the re a re le ss tha n n0 tra de rs o the r tha n m w ho ha v e e ithe r v a lua tio n g re a te r
tha n y
¤
S a nd inde x lo w e r tha n l o r v a lua tio n g re a te r tha n x
¤
S a nd inde x hig he r tha n lg
+ rPrf the re a re e x a c tly n0 tra de rs o the r tha n m w ho ha v e e ithe r v a lua tio n g re a te r
tha n y
¤
S a nd inde x lo w e r tha n l o r v a lua tio n g re a te r tha n x
¤




28then a little algebra shows that
Pn


















i=1 ti(v) = 0. To complete the proof, it su±ces to show that fq;tg is incentive feasible.
By integration by parts, we obtain



















































so Lemma 1 guarantees that fq;tg is incentive feasible. Q.E.D
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